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NOTES AND COMMENTS
APPLICABILITY OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE STATUTE
TO RESIDENT AUTOMOBILE DRIVERS
Forward-looking steps were taken by every American jurisdiction,
after the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hess v. Paw-
lowski,' to subject the non-resident motorist to the jurisdiction of local
tribunals for wrongful acts committed by him while using local highways.
It now begins to appear, from decisions such as that of the Supreme Court
of Colorado in the case of Carlson v. District Court of the City and
County of Denver,2 that most state legislatures, when dealing with the
problem of the non-resident driver, overlooked the equally vexatious
problem of how to treat with the resident driver who leaves the state
after an accident but before jurisdiction can be acquired over him or his
property.
The case in question arose out of a collision in Colorado between
automobiles operated by one Fodor and one Carlson. Carlson's car bore
Illinois license plates at the time. Fodor filed suit in Colorado against
Carlson and undertook to secure jurisdiction by serving summons on
the Secretary of State of Colorado pursuant to a typical statute on the
subject.3  He alleged that Carlson was a non-resident at the time of the
accident, being then a resident of New York. Notice to Carlson was com-
pleted by sending him a registered article for which Fodor obtained
Carlson's signed receipt. Upon Fodor's affidavit as to these facts, a
continuance for the purpose of taking evidence and for the entry of a
default judgment was granted. Carlson then appeared specially and
moved to quash the service, offering an affidavit to the effect that he was
a resident of Colorado on the date of the accident and had remained
such until six months thereafter when he moved to New York to accept
the pastorate of a church. He explained the use of foreign license plates
by declaring that he had moved to Colorado from Illinois some five months
I274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
2116 Colo. 330, 180 P. (2d) 525 (1947).
3 Colo. Stats. Ann. 1935, Ch. 16, §48, and 1937 Supp. §48(1), provides: "The
operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle on a public highway in this state
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such non-resident of the secretary
of state to be his or its true and lawful attorney, upon whom may be served all
lawful civil process in any action or proceedings against him or it, growing out
of any accident or collision in which such non-resident may be involved while
operating a motor vehicle on such public highway. .. "
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before the accident but had neglected to purchase local plates as his
work was such that he might be required to leave Colorado at any time.
Carlson's motion was denied and he was ordered to answer the complaint.
He then filed an original proceeding for a writ of prohibition in the
Colorado Supreme Court, which court held that he was not subject to
substituted service in the fashion indicated because the statute applied
only to drivers who were non-residents at the time the cause of action
arose. The writ of prohibition was, accordingly, granted.
The problem is not entirely a new one, but the decision serves to
re-emphasize a weakness to be found in the statutes of most states, in-
cluding that of Illinois,4 where a similar result would probably have to
be reached if and when the occasion arises. As these statutes relate to
non-resident drivers only, they leave injured persons without a local
remedy against those who, at the time the cause of action accrues, are
residents of the state in which the accident or collision occurs but who
subsequently abandon residence before jurisdiction is acquired and there-
after remain outside the state. The purpose supporting the constitu-
tionality of such statutes as a proper exercise of the police power against
non-residents because necessary to provide for a speedy adjudication of
the rights of the parties5 is defeated where local wrongdoers are able to
remove themselves from the situs subsequent to the accident and thereby
defeat the acquisition of jurisdiction.
To illustrate the inadequacy of such statutes, reference may be made
not only to the instant case but also to decisions like that in Berger v.
Superior Court in and for Yuba County6 where the defendant, stationed
in California during the war years, was involved in a highway accident
one month before his discharge from service. He returned to his original
domicile after his discharge and substituted service was held improper,
prohibition being granted on the ground that he was not within the
purview of the California Vehicle Code. 7 Similar results have been ob-
tained in Iowa,8 the District of Columbia, 9 and in North Dakota.'0 A
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 , § 23, is practically identical with the Colorado
statute referred to in note 3, ante.
5 See Pawloski v. Hess, 253 Mass. 478, 149 N. E. 122 (1925), affirmed in 274 U. S.
352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
679 Cal. App. (2d) 425, 179 P. (2d) 600 (1947).
7 Deering, Cal. Vehicle Code, § 404.
sWelsh v. Ruopp, 228 Iowa 70, 289 N. WV. 760 (1940).
9 In Wood v. White, 68 App. D. C. 341, 97 F. (2d) 646 (1938), the court held
that D. C. Code, Tit. 40, § 403, could not be extended to include residents who
become non-residents. See also Suit v. Shailer, 18 F. Supp. 568 (1937), where it
was held that Md. Ann. Code 1939, Art. 56, § 167, did not apply to non-residents
who temporarily reside in Maryland for more than three months in any one year.
10 Northwestern Mortgage & Security Co. v. Noel Const. Co., 71 N. D. 256, 300
N. W. 28 (1941).
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decision in the last-mentioned jurisdiction furnishes an extreme demonstra-
tion of the inefficacy of the general type of statute for there the defend-
ant became involved in a collision in North Dakota, his domicile for
thirty years, while driving to Washington to establish a new domicile.
Service on him through the local commissioner of insurance was held
invalid as defendant was treated as still being a resident at the time of the
collision.1 The evident obstruction to justice in such cases lies not in the
construction given to the statutes by the courts but rather with the law-
making bodies who have failed to perceive one danger while correcting
another.
A small number of jurisdictions, aware of these shortcomings, have
enacted legislation which seems to solve the problem. They have en-
larged the scope of their statutes so as to permit substituted service upon
one who, whether resident or not, uses the highways of the state and
thereby appoints some suitable public official as his true and lawful at-
torney for purpose of service with respect to all claims growing out of the
use of the highway. In Ohio, for example, the injured person's remedy
is protected by a statute which specifically includes resident drivers who
become non-residents after the accident. 12  The Pennsylvania provision's
is much like that in Ohio, but the one in Montana has been made ap-
plicable to "any person who operates a vehicle on a public way."4 Per-
haps the most comprehensive statute was one possessed by New York
which not only applied to residents who subsequently became non-resi-
dents but declared that absence for thirty days, whether intended to be
temporary or permanent, was sufficient to justify substituted service.15
11 See note 10, ante.
12 Page Ohio Gen. Code Ann., Vol. 4-A, § 6308-5, provides: "This act shall be
construed to extend the right of service of process upon non-residents and upon
residents who subsequently become non-residents or who conceal their whereabouts.
." The statute was held constitutional In Hendershot v. Ferkel, 144 Ohio St.
112, 56 N. E. (2d) 205 (1944), where defendant, residing in Ohio at the time of
and for one and one-half years after the accident, subsequently moved to Cali-
fornia. Service on the Secretary of State of Ohio was held sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.
i3 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. 1931, App. to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2077,
provides that the rules relating to non-resident defendants shall apply to "actions
as to which the laws of this Commonwealth authorize service of process upon a
non-resident or a resident who becomes a non-resident or who conceals his where-
abouts." See also McCall v. Gates, 354 Pa. St. 158, 47 A. (2d) 211 (1946).
14Mont. Rev. Code 1936, App. Vol. 1, § 1760.13. Held constitutional and ap-
plicable in State ex rel. Thompson v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 108
Mont. 362, 91 P. (2d) 422 (1939), a suit against a Montana resident who left the
state two weeks after the accident.
1' Thompson's Cons. Laws N. Y. 1939, Vehicle & Traffic Law, § 52a, declares:
"The operation by a resident of a motor vehicle on a public highway in this state
. . . shall, in all cases where such resident shall have removed from this state,
prior to the service of legal process upon him . . . and shall have been absent
therefrom for thirty days continuously, be deemed equivalent to an appointment
by such resident of the Secretary of State to be his true and lawful attorney.
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The few cases which have arisen thereunder clearly disclose the beneficial
effects of so complete and adequate a law. 6
While none of these last-mentioned statutes have faced constitutional
tests before the United States Supreme Court as yet, there would seem to
be as much justification for upholding such measures when applied to
residents who later become non-residents as there is for enforcing the
same against those who are non-residents at the time of the accident.
If a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the state may not
cancel authority given for service on an agent merely by surrendering its
license, at least as to acts done while there,'1 7 there seems little reason
to treat the resident who withdraws from the state in any different light.
Granted that differences exist between artificial persons and human beings
and that to apply such a rule to every transaction within the state might
transcend constitutional limitations on due process, still the recognition
already accorded to the proposition that, in the public interest, the state
"may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote
care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use the
highways, '"18 should warrant different treatment in highway accident
cases. Admittedly such a statute, being in derogation of the common law,
would have to be construed strictly, 9 but that fact does not militate against
its constitutionality. Moreover, from the standpoint of equal protection
of the laws, it should pass muster for it puts the resident who stays at
home, the foreigner who temporarily comes within the state, and the resi-
dent who flees therefrom, in the same sphere, i.e. each being made amenable
within the state for acts done while there.
As no conceivable constitutional objection exists, it would seem not only
proper but advisable for most state legislatures to re-examine their
vehicle codes in order to cover a marked deficiency in existing statutes.
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* . ." N. Y. Laws 1941, Ch. 248, added the provision: "Whether such absence
is intended to be temporary or permanent." For some unexplained reason, the
N. Y. legislature, at the time it added such amendment, also repealed the major
provision.
16 McNally v. Howard, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 7 (1943) ; Reed v. Lombardi, 181 Misc.
805, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (1943); Marano v. Finn, 155 Misc. 793, 281 N. Y. S.
440 (1935).
17 In general, see Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., Perm. Ed., Vol. 18, § 8762.
18Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 at 355, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 at 1094
(1927).
19 See, for example, Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383
Il. 569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836 (1943), confining the application of the Illinois statute
to accidents occurring on the highway. Further limitations may be observed in
Rose v. Gisi, 139 Neb. 593, 298 N. W. 333 (1941); Balter v. Webner, 175 Misc.
184, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 918 (1940); Haughey v. Mineola Garage, 174 Misc. 332, 20
N. Y. S. (2d) 857 (1940) ; Hendershot v. Ferkel, 144 Ohio St. 112, 56 N. E. (2d)
205 (1944) ; Williams v. Meredith, 326 Pa. St. 570, 192 A. 924 (1937).
